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Contextual fear conditioning is thought to involve the synaptic plasticity-dependent
establishment in hippocampus of representations of to-be-conditioned contexts
which can then become associated with USs in the amygdala. A conceptual and
computational model of this process is proposed in which contextual attributes are
assumed to be sampled serially and randomly during contextual exposures. Given
this assumption, moment-to-moment information about such attributes will often be
quite different from one exposure to another and, in particular, between exposures
during which representations are created, exposures during which conditioning occurs,
and during recall sessions. This presents challenges to current conceptual models of
hippocampal function. In order to meet these challenges, our model’s hippocampus
was made to operate in different modes during representation creation and recall,
and non-hippocampal machinery was constructed that controlled these hippocampal
modes. This machinery uses a comparison between contextual information currently
observed and information associated with existing hippocampal representations of
familiar contexts to compute the Bayesian Weight of Evidence that the current context is
(or is not) a known one, and it uses this value to assess the appropriateness of creation or
recall modes. The model predicts a number of known phenomena such as the immediate
shock deficit, spurious fear conditioning to contexts that are absent but similar to actually
present ones, and modulation of conditioning by pre-familiarization with contexts. It also
predicts a number of as yet unknown phenomena.
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Introduction
During Pavlovian fear conditioning, animals become afraid of both specific cues that predict
the imminent onset of aversive events such as foot shock, and the situation or “context” in
which the shock occurred. Fear conditioning provides one of neuroscience’s most promising
and active arenas for analyzing neural mechanisms of learning, generally. Both cue and
context fear conditioning seem to be due to plastic change at synapses within the amygdala
(reviewed by Fanselow and LeDoux, 1999; Blair et al., 2001), but there are striking differences
in the phenomenology and the neural circuitry of cue and context fear conditioning.
Anatomically, cued fear seems to involve pathways from thalamus and cortex directly to
the lateral nucleus of amygdala (LeDoux and Clugnet, 1990; LeDoux et al., 1990; Romanski
and LeDoux, 1992; Boatman and Kim, 2006), whereas context fear utilizes a pathway from
cortex to hippocampus to basal amygdala (Young et al., 1994; Maren and Fanselow, 1995;
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Bast et al., 2003; Matus-Amat et al., 2004; Calandreau et al.,
2005; Parsons and Otto, 2008; Schenberg and Oliveira, 2008;
Onishi and Xavier, 2010), though the exact route of this latter
pathway remains under investigation (Fanselow and Dong,
2010). Moreover, development of context fear depends not
only on synaptic plasticity within amygdala but also within
hippocampus (Kiernan and Cranney, 1992; Fanselow, 2000;
Rudy and O’Reilly, 2001; Matus-Amat et al., 2004; Stote and
Fanselow, 2004; Rudy, 2009). Phenomenologically, fear becomes
conditioned to a cue that warns of shock any time that the cue
occurs. But fear of context does not develop if shocks occur too
soon after an animal is introduced into a situation; the shock
must be delayed by at least some 30 s, and full conditionability
does not develop for several minutes (the so-called “immediate
shock deficit”) (Blanchard et al., 1976; Fanselow, 1986, 1990;
Landeira-Fernandez et al., 2006).
That there should be substantial differences between cue and
context fear conditioning is not surprising, because learning to
fear a context presents the nervous system with problems that
do not occur during conditioning to simple warnings of a US.
Contexts are defined by stable configurations or “conjunctions”
of elementary cues (referred to here as “attributes”) that are
present over extended periods of time. It can be expected that
brains come to a learning situation pre-wired to represent the
simple cues that, at least in the laboratory, are usually used as CSs
for imminent USs. Such cues may be made to evoke fear simply
by strengthening synapses between these representation neurons
and amygdala fear-producing cells (see Blair et al., 2001).
However, it cannot be expected that neurons representing
novel contexts, qua contexts, pre-exist. Neurons that innately
represent the simple attributes which compose a context might of
course come to evoke fear, but conditioning based on themwould
have unsatisfactory properties: Animals can presumably perceive
only a small subset of a context’s attributes at any one moment,
and at each new entry to a given context, somewhat different
attributes are likely to be sampled. Conditioning established
to the small set of attributes that happened to be represented
neurally at the moment of US occurrence would not produce
fear during a different sampling of the same context. Therefore,
stable contextual fear conditioning would seem to require the
prior creation of a neural representation of the to-be-conditioned
context that is constant despite variable samplings of the context’s
attributes. Also, there are likely to be many attributes of a context
that are common tomultiple contexts; if context fear were evoked
by attributes per se, the existence of common attributes might
well promote non-adaptive over-generalization. These problems
can be avoided if conditioning occurs to a representation that is
activated by a conjunction of contextual attributes rather than
the individual attributes themselves. According to a variety of
lines of current thinking, the role of the hippocampus in learning
is to rapidly create conjunctive representations of combinations
of simpler cues that then act as the neural stimulus for learnt
contextual fear as well other kinds of learning (Fanselow, 1986,
2000; Kiernan and Cranney, 1992; Rudy and O’Reilly, 2001;
Matus-Amat et al., 2004; Stote and Fanselow, 2004; Rudy, 2009).
Current theoretical thinking about the role of the
hippocampus in learning stems from the work of Marr
(1971). He proposed that, for a variety of reasons, the cortex
learns slowly. But obviously animals must be able to learn
some things rapidly. He argued that the intrinsic connectivity
of the hippocampus and its connections to the cortex were
consistent with the hypothesis that the hippocampus rapidly
stores information about cortical patterns of activity. It does this,
he suggested, in such a way that any sufficient fraction of the
cortical activity pattern that was present at learning can evoke
both the complete hippocampal pattern and, via that, the full
cortical pattern that led to the learning. The fixed hippocampal
patterns of Marr and followers theories (Marr, 1971; Skaggs and
McNaughton, 1992; O’Reilly and McClelland, 1994; McClelland
et al., 1995; O’Reilly and Rudy, 2001; Scharfman, 2007; Myers
and Scharfman, 2011; Ketz et al., 2013) are just what are needed
for representations to drive contextual fear responses. They
are constant despite partial and variable sensory input, and
since they are relatively non-overlapping (“orthogonal”), even
for quite similar contexts, they would not lead to untoward
generalization.
However, the fact that the nervous system does not receive
information about all the attributes of a context at once means
that over time there must be a continual evaluation and re-
evaluation of the evidence as to whether the set of contextual
cues so far sampled is from a familiar context or from a new
context for which a representation should be established. This
is essentially a Bayesian inference problem. The present model
assumes a cortical-hippocampal circuit fairly similar to those
of Marr and his followers. But it uses the Bayesian weight of
evidence (Kass and Rafter, 1995; Gallistel, 2009) that the current
context is or is not a known one to control learning within
the hippocampal/cortical circuit and the hippocampus-amygdala
pathway.We thus refer to themodel as the Bayesian Context Fear
Algorithm/Automaton (BACON).
Methods
Most details not needed to understand Results are deferred to
Supplementary Material.
Scope
The goal of this work was to create a rational and neurally
plausible algorithm for context fear conditioning. The
development over time of hippocampus-independent engrams
(systems type consolidation), was not considered but it is
planned to address it at a later time.
BACON Neurons
The resting potential of BACON neurons is taken as zero,
and membrane potentials (V) are specified relative to this
baseline. Active synapses are thought of as causing post-synaptic
conductances for specific ions. Excitatory input moves V toward
an excitatory reversal potential E. Active synaptic inputs to
a neuron cause post-synaptic conductances given by G =
A  W where G is conductance relative to membrane leakage
conductance, W the synapse’s strength or “weight,” which can
vary from zero to any positive value, and A the activity level
(firing rate, or “activation”) of the presynaptic neuron. The
net depolarization of a neuron receiving both excitatory and
inhibitory input is given by:
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 2 May 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 112
Krasne et al. A context fear learning automaton
FIGURE 1 | Cortex-hippocampus-amygdala circuit (A) basic circuit.
Explained in text. Pink synapses subject to LTP in appropriate modes.
Circular arrows in EC’in cells indicate working memory properties. (B)
Comparison between biological and BACON circuits. *indicates absence of a
CA1 analog in BACON, as various simplifications made its presumed
functions redundant (see Results).
TABLE 1 | Properties of BACON neurons.
Cell type Properties
EC’in Binary. Working memory properties-see Results
EC’out Binary. Thrsh = ThrshCtx
DG’ KWTA activation rule in creation and update modes; rate coded in
recall mode
CA3’ KWTA activation rule
Amyg’ Rate coded
V =
(
Ge · E
1+ Ge+ Gi
)
(1)
where Ge is total excitatory and Gi total inhibitory conductance.
Some BACONneurons are binary, firing at a maximum rate of
unity when V is above some threshold value. For the remainder,
activation rises linearly from zero starting at some threshold
voltage (thrsh) and reaching a maximum of unity at a higher
voltage (mxat). We refer to this as a “linear sigmoid activation
function,” which we write as follows:
Activation = linsig(V|thrsh, mxat). (2)
The basic cortical-hippocampal-amygdala circuit of BACON is
shown in Figure 1, which will be explained in Results. Table 1
gives salient properties of the various classes of neurons. As
explained in Results, algorithm neuron types are named for their
intended biological parallels but with a prime mark added to
distinguish them from their biological counterparts.
Most of the computations done by the algorithm are explained
in logical or mathematical terms. Actual neural circuitry that
could underlie them is unknown, but circuitry that could
compute the Bayesian Weight of Evidence, which is central to
the model, and circuitry that could use it to control hippocampal
and amygdala function are sketched out to demonstrate that
they could be carried out by neurons. Ways of carrying
out arithmetical operations such as subtraction, multiplication,
exponentiation, etc. assumed done within this hypothetical
circuitry and ways of implementing K-Winners-Take-All control
of neural firing, used extensively in BACON, are discussed in the
Supplementary Material (Topic H).
The values and definitions of BACON’s parameters are
summarized for reference in Table 2.
Computations
A flow diagram of the computations done by BACON is provided
in Supplementary Material (Topic G).
Results
The goal of this work was to construct a biologically plausible
algorithm/automaton for context fear conditioning. It is assumed
that upon entering a context its attributes are observed
(“sampled”) serially in random order without replacement over
an extended period of time and are held in a working memory.
As attributes are sampled, we wanted the automaton to compare
them to the recalled attributes of previously experienced contexts
and use the comparison to decide whether the context is a known
one, in which case existing associations to it should be expressed
and new ones made, or a novel one, in which case a neural
representation of it should be created and further associations
made to that. The algorithm we have created deals with these
matters using analogs of cortical, hippocampal, and amygdala
structures; we name these for their biological counterparts
appended with a prime (′) mark.
The Basic Cortical-Hippocampal-amygdala
Circuit
Structure
Figure 1A presents BACON’s basic circuit, which as indicated
in Figure 1B, is formally similar to its biological counterpart.
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TABLE 2 | BACON parameter definitions and values.
Numbers of EC’in and EC’out cells NCtx 1000
Numbers of DG and CA3′ cells NHipp 10,000
Number of attributes per context NA 100
Number of attributes common to all contexts (“General” attributes) NGen 50
Number of EC’in neurons innervating each DG neuron F 60
Number of winners of hippocampal KWTA calculations K 60
Minimum number of cells that must be active in CA3 pattern CA3Ptrno for recurrent collateral input to be computed K0 15
Minumum number of EC’in cells that must be active for a hippocampal representation to be created Z0(minZ0) 45
Numer of effective inputs needed for a EC’out cell to fire ThrshCtx 42
Minimum Bayesian weight of evidence for conditioning to occur Bold 3
Negative Bayesian weight of evidence sufficient for representation creation Bnew −3
Minimum Bayesian weight of evidence for addition of attributes to an existing hippocampal representation Badd 15
Bayesian weight of evidence making representation “probably valid” Bpv 3
Amygdala learning rate parameter α 0.025
Factor multiplying excitation produced in CA3′ via direct pathway dpf Varied
As in most models inspired by Marr’s original work, BACON’s
hippocampal circuitry is designed to construct a cortical “image”
of previously experienced events when probed by a sufficient
fraction of the image. It does this by creating a sparse, random
hippocampal representation of the event that can be fully
activated by fragmentary cortical images, and that can then in
turn reactivate all those cortical neurons that were active at
the time that the hippocampal representation was created. In
designing BACON’s hippocampus, we attempted to implement
the presumed basic operational principles of the biological
hippocampus in as clear and simple a form as possible. We did
not include features in the name of fidelity if they did not seem
useful to the task at hand.
Entorhinal cortex
Cortical input is presented to BACON’s hippocampus’ by an
entorhinal cortex (EC’) that consists of NCtx (=1000) input
(EC’in) neurons, each of which innately represents one of the
possible contextual attributes that the automaton can detect.
Hippocampal output back to cortex is via a corresponding
set of output (EC’out) cells. Each context is composed of NA
(=100) attributes of which a number, NGen (=50) are general
to all contexts. When an attribute is sampled the EC’in cell that
represents it becomes active and remains so for the duration the
visit to that context. Neurons that remain active during a working
memory task have in fact been found in entorhinal cortex (e.g.,
Suzuki et al., 1997; Young et al., 1997; Schon et al., 2015).
Dentate (DG’)
DG’ consists of a large number, NHipp (=10,000), of projecting
neurons that during representation creation recode the EC’in
pattern of activity into a sparse, relatively non-overlapping
form (as in O’Reilly and McClelland, 1994). Each DG’
cell is innervated, via Hebbian synapses, by F (=60) EC’in
neurons. All of BACON’s Hebbian synapses are totally ineffective
until potentiated. During representation creation, firing of the
projecting DG’ neurons is subject to regulation by an inhibitory
network that allows only a specified number of the most excited
cells to fire (“K-Winners Take All” (KWTA) behavior). When
operative, this allows K =60 of DG’s 10,000 cells to fire. At other
times, DG’ cells fire at a rate proportional to their excitation.
CA3′
As in the biological hippocampus, CA3′ cells receive input from
EC’in both via DG’ (the “indirect” pathway) and via a direct
pathway from EC’in. As was the case for DG’, each CA3
′ cell is
innervated by F randomly chosen EC’in neurons, but these are
chosen independently of the DG’ innervation. In the biological
hippocampus each CA3 cell is innervated by a small number of
dentate cells, and the synapses, which appear from morphology
to be strong, show some non-Hebbian sort of plasticity of
uncertain function (Bortolotto et al., 2003; Reid et al., 2004). In
BACON this arrangement has been simplified (as considered in
Discussion); each CA3′ cell is innervated by a single DG’ neuron
via a non-plastic synapse whose strength can be modulated. CA3′
cells, like DG’ cells, are subject to KWTA regulation of their
firing; the number of cells allowed to fire is the same as in
DG’. In the biological hippocampus, each CA3 cell recurrently
innervates other CA3 cells via Hebb synapses. This is thought
to form an auto-associative memory that binds together the
member-neurons of each representation so that when a sufficient
subset is activated the rest will follow (e.g., Gardner-Medwin,
1976; McNaughton and Morris, 1987; Treves and Rolls, 1994).
In the biological hippocampus each CA3 cell innervates only a
portion of others; in BACON we have for simplicity allowed full
innervation.
CA3′, CA1′, and EC’out
Entorhinal cortex receives from hippocampus representations of
contexts that consist of the activity of essentially random sets of
cells. It is thought that these are able to recreate entorhinal output
replicas of the entorhinal input patterns that they encode because
during representation creation potentiation develops between
cells of the ’random’ hippocampal representation and EC output
cells corresponding to EC input cells that are active (e.g., Treves
and Rolls, 1994).
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It seems as if this function would be best served if each CA3
cell were to directly innervate each entorhinal output neuron via
a Hebb synapse, which is exactly how BACON is constructed.
However, fan-ins and fan-outs of most biological neurons are too
low for each real CA3 neuron to completely innervate every EC
output cell. The interposition of CA1 between CA3 and EC in the
biological Hippocampus is thought to mitigate this limitation by
recoding the CA3 output into a less sparse form in CA1 so that
every EC output cell can receive some innervation that is specific
to each encoded pattern (e.g., Kesner and Rolls, 2015). A second
function of biological CA1 is thought to be to help complete
representations that, because of incomplete innervation in the
recurrent collateral network, were incompletely reconstructed
by CA3 auto-associative mechanisms (Treves, 1995). However,
because in BACON we allow complete innervation within the
CA3 recurrent collateral system, this function is also unneeded.
Since a CA1′ would therefore have served no useful function in
BACON, it was for simplicity omitted.
Amygdala’
Although we assume that hippocampal circuitry evolved to allow
reconstruction of the neocortical activity that occurred during
past events, it is to the hippocampal code proper and not to the
cortical reconstruction of a context’s attributes that fear becomes
conditioned in BACON’s amygdala’. We constructed BACON in
this way for three reasons: (i) We believe that it is consistent with
the weight of available evidence (as discussed in Krasne et al.,
2011). In particular, it appears from the immediate shock deficit
that fear does not readily become conditioned to the attributes of
a context per se. (ii) Hippocampal representations of very similar
contexts overlap much less than do cortical ones, which makes
discriminations easier to learn. (iii) Hippocampal representations
are (by construction) constant whereas cortical ones change
as more is learned about a context; changing representations
would lead to unwanted variations in expression of previously
conditioned fear.
The actual (biological) pathway via which information about
active hippocampal representations reaches the amygdala from
the dorsal hippocampus is a matter of current research. Based
on various lines of anatomical, and more recently labeling and
optogenetic data, ventral hippocampus as well as various cortical
structures have been suggested as possibly being on the relevant
pathway Maren and Holt, 2004; Fanselow and Dong, 2010,
Cowansage et al., 2014; Tanaka et al., 2014; Jin and Maren, 2015.
Whatever the final resolution of this matter, BACON assumes
(as said above), that it is the dorsal hippocampal representation
(or downstream, possibly cortical, versions of it), and not cortical
attribute-representing neurons themselves, to which contextual
fear responses become conditioned.
CA3′ innervates amygdala’ fear-producing cells via Hebb
synapses, and conditioned fear develops when synapses between
active CA3′ cells and amygdala’ neurons that are depolarized by
an unconditioned stimulus become potentiated.
Operational Modes
The above features of BACON are all equivalent to, or slight
modifications of, conventional ideas about the role of the
hippocampus in creating and utilizing representations of
complex stimuli and in context fear conditioning. However,
BACON departs from most conventional thinking in that it
includes circuitry conceptualized as outside the hippocampus
that makes evidence-based decisions as to whether the
automaton’s current context is or is not a familiar one, and
depending on its conclusions, configures the hippocampus and
amygdala appropriately for representation creation or recall
as well as controlling conditionability and the expression of
previously conditioned fear. This control is exerted by enabling
or disabling the possibility of Hebbian potentiation, modulating
the strength of certain synapses, and turning on or off the
KWTA capability of those regions that are potentially subject
to it. The idea that hippocampal circuitry is subject to task-
based reconfiguration has precedents in the work of O’Reilly,
McClelland, Rudy, and Hasselmo (e.g., O’Reilly and McClelland,
1994; Hasselmo et al., 1995; O’Reilly and Rudy, 2001; Hasselmo
and Sarter, 2010).
Representation creation
When BACON decides it is in a novel context, it configures the
circuitry of Figure 1 for representation creation (Figure 2A). This
includes (1) enabling the plasticity of all the Hebbian synapses of
hippocampus and cortex, (2) enabling transmission at all EC’in-
DG’, EC’in-CA3′, and EC’in-EC’out synapses (irrespective of the
state of potentiation of the plastic synapses), and (3) enabling the
KWTA circuitry of DG’ (the KWTA circuitry of CA3′ is always
operative). Finally, the strength of transmission at DG’ to CA3′
synapses is up-modulated sufficiently so that the K cells that will
fire in CA3′ will be the partners of the K winners of the DG’
KWTA competition and not be affected by direct EC’in input.
Under these conditions the K DG’ cells that are most strongly
excited by the active EC’in attribute cells fire and drive their
CA3′ partners. The synapses between all active EC’in cells and
the active DG’-CA3′ partners then become potentiated. It should
be noted that this method of determining which DG’ and CA3′
cells come to represent a context ensures that the representations
will be composed of those DG’-CA3′ “dyads” whose DG’ member
is most strongly innervated by the EC’in cells representing the
attributes that had been sampled up to the moment of the
representations creation.
Once theKmost excited CA3′ neurons fire, the activity of each
active CA3′ cell propagates into its dendrites and collaterals, and
the recurrent synapses between one active CA3′ cell and another
potentiate. The permanent representation of the current context
has at that point been established as the active set of DG’-CA3′
dyads. It is the potentiated recurrent collateral synapses that bind
together the set of cells that comprise a representation, and it
is the potentiated synapses in the direct and indirect pathways
that are responsible for the ability of a given context’s attributes
to call out its proper representation. Finally, the synapses
between the active CA3′ representation neurons and the set of
active EC’out attribute cells that are being driven by the active
EC’in cells become potentiated so that in the future when this
representation becomes active it will cause those same EC’out cells
to fire.
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FIGURE 2 | (A) Creation, (B) Recall, and (C) Update modes. Explained in
text but some details follow: (A) Creation mode details: (1) Noise in the
system prevents any ties of excitation of DG’ cells during representation
creation, so exactly K DG’ cells fire. (2) Potentiation of synaptic weights of
EC’in synapses on each DG’ or CA3
′ cell occurs in such a way that the
weights of potentiating synapses sums to one; such normalization of weights
is needed so that the representations of contexts created with larger
numbers of EC’in neurons active do not dominate in later KWTA
competitions. Other synapses potentiate in one step to fixed weights. (B)
Recall mode details: (1) During production of the pre-recurrent CA3′ activity
pattern CA3Ptrno, noise in the system prevents any ties of excitation, so at
most, exactly K DG’ cells fire. If the number of active neurons in CA3Ptrno is
less than K0, CA3
′ activity is extinguished until the next attribute is sampled.
(2) The excitation evoked by recurrent collateral activity causes the K most
excited CA3′ cells to fire to produce CA3Ptrn1 and higher order patterns with
ties not being broken, so more than K cells may fire; allowance of more than
K cells is necessary for convergence to the correct pattern (see
Supplementary Material, Topic B). (3) When evidence for two patterns is
exactly equal, CA3PtrnFnl will contain more than K active cells, and further
downstream actions will be suppressed. (C) Update mode specifics: (1)
EC’in–EC’out transmission is enabled bi-directionally (purple top block
arrows) so that the representations of all currently sampled and recalled
attributes will be active in both EC’in and ECout. (2) Transmission in a
powerful “backward” pathway from CA3′ to DG’ (up-pointing purple block
arrow) and KTWA control of DG’ firing are enabled. As a result, DG’ activity
mirrors CA3Pfnl, which will be the complete representation with no other cells
active. (3) EC’in, DG’, CA3
′ and CA3′-EC’out synapses become
LTP-susceptible, and all coactive EC’in-DG’ and CA3
′ synapses and all
CA3′-ECout synapses become potentiated if they are not already so. As in
representation creation, synaptic weights of active EC’in synapses on each
active DG’ and CA3′ cell are normalized to a sum of one. *Information flow in
the biological dentate-CA3 pathway is usually considered to be only in the
forward direction, and therefore the above use of “backward” transmission
may seem biologically implausible. However, a backward pathway from CA3
to dentate has in fact been described (Scharfman, 2007; Myers and
Scharfman, 2011), and there is also some evidence for retrograde chemical
signaling across synapses in the forward pathway. Contractor et al. (2002)
that could imaginably trigger LTP at presynaptically active synapses on
dentate neurons innervating active CA3 cells. We therefore do not consider
this computationally motivated feature biologically implausible.
It should be noted that, as will be explained below,
representation creation generally occurs when only a portion
of a context’s attributes have been sampled. Therefore, even if
two contexts are extremely similar, their representations will be
created with somewhat different sets of ECin attribute cells active.
In some biological experiments to be discussed, DG’ was
inactivated during encoding. If this is done in BACON, it will be
the KWTA properties of CA3′ operating on input via the direct
path that will determine which CA3′ neurons comprise the new
representation.
Recall
In the resting state, the cortical and hippocampal parts of
Figure 1 are configured for recall. In this mode (Figure 2B)
no synaptic plasticity is enabled, and plastic synapses operate
according to their current state of potentiation. When in recall
mode, the ratio of the strength of direct to indirect pathway
synapses on CA3′ cells is a parameter dpf (direct path factor), the
effect of whose value we study below. KWTA control is disabled
in DG’ during recall, with the result that cells there fire at rates
proportional to their excitation; however KWTA control is always
operative in CA3′.
Under these conditions active EC’in neurons excite DG’ and
CA3′ cells via any previously potentiated synapses. The DG’
cells fire in proportion to their excitation, exciting CA3′ cells
proportionately, and the direct input from EC’in sums with the
excitation from DG’. The KWTA rule then determines CA3′
firing. The pattern of activity at this stage we call CA3Ptrno.
Once sampling of a context’s attributes is fairly far advanced,
the strongly excited cells included in CA3Ptrno will mostly
be ones that were active when a context’s representation was
created. However, earlier in sampling, when only a modest
fraction of the total set of a context’s attributes have been
sampled, it can easily occur that representation cells that do
not represent the current context will be part of CA3Ptrno. This
happens because, as mentioned above, when two contexts have
attributes in common (which they always do, since NGen is 50%
of NA), which of these get encoded when their representations
are created is usually somewhat arbitrary. Therefore, during
recall in one of the contexts, shared attributes that were encoded
for the other context may well be the ones first sampled and may
cause representation cells unique to this (incorrect) context to be
activated.
Next, CA3Ptrno will generate a new pattern of CA3
′ excitation
via the potentiated synapses of the recurrent collateral system,
and the K most excited cells will again fire. This process repeats
a specified number of times until a final pattern referred to as
CA3PtrnFnl results. In BACON, where each CA3
′ cell recurrently
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innervates each other one, a CA3Ptrno in which a plurality
of the cells are part of some representation will, after two
iterations generate a CA3PtrnFnl in which the cells active are the
K representation cells for that context and no others (so long as
not too many extremely similar contexts have been encoded – see
Supplementary Material, Topic B). If no context’s representation
cells are in a plurality, CA3PtrnFnl will consist of more thanK cells
(a summation of more than one representation), and in that case
no downstream activity will be produced (see Figure 2, caption
and Supplementary Material, Topic B).
Finally, CA3PtrnFnl excites EC’out cells via any potentiated
synapses, and those EC’out neurons that get excited by a sufficient
proportion (ThrshCtx) of the active CA3′ cells fire.
Representation updating
If, after sampling a new attribute, BACON determines that
it has correctly identified the context it is in, or it has
created a new representation during the current session, it
adds the newly sampled attribute to the currently active
contextual representation. It does this by going into updatemode
(Figure 2C). In this mode, once CA3PtrnFnl has been activated,
backward transmission from CA3′ to DG’ is enabled so that DG’
mirrors CA3′ activity. Transmission between EC’in and EC’out
is also bi-directionally enabled so that the EC’in-EC’out pairs
corresponding to all currently sampled and recalled attributes
are active. And plasticity is enabled at EC’in-DG’ and -CA3
′ and
CA3′-EC’out synapses. These actions associate the newly sampled
attribute with the current representation, while keeping constant
the set of DG’-CA3′ pairs that constitute the representation.
Context fear conditioning
Contextual fear conditioning in BACON is due to potentiation of
CA3′-amygdala’ synapses and is explained at the end of the next
section.
Bayesian Control of Operation Mode of
Hippocampo-Cortico-Amygdala Circuitry
Based on comparisons of current EC’in activity, the status of
which depends on the outcome of BACON’s sampling of the
current context so far, and EC’out activity, which depends on
the automaton’s cumulative past experience, BACON determines
the Bayesian weight of evidence (Kass and Rafter, 1995;
Gallistel, 2009, here denoted as BRep) that an active hippocampal
representation really is that of the current context. It then uses
this value to decide whether to create a new representation or
update the current one, whether to permit fear conditioning if a
US occurs, and whether to allow expression of conditioned fear.
Evaluating Representation Validity
The calculation of BRep is based on (1) the number of attributes
of the current context that have been sampled and have active
representations in EC’in (referred to as Zcur –for “Zcurrent”),
(2) the number of attribute representations activated in EC’out
by the current hippocampal representation (Zrec–for “Zrecalled”),
and (3) the number of active attribute representations in
common between EC’in and EC’out (Zcom–for “Zcommon”). BRep
is defined as:
BRep (Zcom|Zcur,Zrec) = log10
P [Zcom| Same,Zcur,Zrec]
P
[
Zcom|Diff,Zcur,Zrec
] (3)
where “Same” means that the active contextual representation is
that of the actual context and “Diff” means that it is not.
Figure 3A graphs BRep as a function of Zcom for a range
of values of Zcur and Zrec; the combinatorial formulas used
to calculate these values are given in Supplementary Material
(Topic C). High positive values mean that the specified degree
of communality between EC’in and EC’out activity makes it very
likely that the actual current context is in fact the one that was
present when the currently active hippocampal representation
was created. A large negative value indicates that the actual
current context is not the one currently represented by the
hippocampus. A value of zero means that there is no basis for
believing either hypothesis. We note that BRep = 0 if EC’out
remains silent, as it does when the number of cells active in the
initial CA3′ pattern of the computation cycle (XPo) is less than
K0 (the number active cells in CA3Ptrno needed to activate the
recurrent collaterals).
The relationships shown in Figure 3A conform well with
logical or intuitive judgments based on the same information.
Consider for example the bold black curves for Zcur = 60. (1) For
any given number of current and recalled attributes, the greater
Zcom, the more likely it is that the currently active representation
is in fact that of the current context, and correspondingly,
BRep increases as a function of Zcom. (2) The more one recalls
about the context one thinks one is in, the more strongly a
low value of Zcom implies that one is actually somewhere else,
and conversely. Consistent with this, for a given value of Zcom,
BRep decreases as Zrec increases. (3) If the number of currently
observed attributes that are different from ones remembered
(Zcur–Zcom) plus the number remembered (Zrec) is greater than
the number of attributes there are per context (NA), then the
current context cannot be valid. Consistent with this, BRep goes
precipitously negative if Zcur - Zcom + Zrec > NA.
We will later discuss experiments in which animals are pre-
familiarized to contexts in which they will subsequently be
conditioned. Intuitively, it would be expected that the more
attributes of the context were previously learned, the sooner on
average the current context could be identified with assurance.
Figure 4A plots BRep values for the theoretically predicted
average (referred to as “expected”) Zcom for a test in the
conditioning context; we refer to BRep so calculated as Expected
BRep. The greater Zrec due to experience with the context in prior
sessions, the faster Expected BRep rises as more attributes are
sampled in the test session.
Control of Representation Creation and Updating
This section describes the logical rules used for controlling the
state of the basic circuit; neural circuitry for implementing these
rules is discussed separately.
We define certain levels of BRep (Bold, Bnew, Badd, and Bpv)
that determine the mode of operation (Figure 2) of the basic
circuit, sometimes along with other conditions. Bold is taken as
the lowest level of BRep that provides reasonable but not foolproof
evidence that the currently active hippocampal representation
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FIGURE 3 | Bayesian Weight of Evidence, BRep: Exact calculations and
neural circuit that emulates them. (A) Exact values of BRep are plotted as a
function of Zcom for a variety of values of Zcur and Zrec. The values for a given
value of Zcur are all in the same color. The values for Zrec = 60 and Zcur =
60–90 are made bold black to highlight one set of values for reference when
reading the relevant text. (B) Neural circuit that approximates exact
calculations. (B1) Circuit for getting rate-coded inputs Zcur , Zrec, and Zcom to
the rest of the circuit. It is assumed that Zcur , Zrec, and Zcom fire at rates
proportional to their number of active inputs; interneurons are binary cells that
fire when both their inputs are active (i.e., threshold, θ = 2). (B2) BRep
computing circuit. Because BRep is symmetrical with respect to Zcur and Zrec
(i.e., their values can be exchanged without effect), these are transformed by
the module at the lower left to Zlo and Zhi (the lower and higher of the two).
Neurons of the computational module proper are labeled I–V for reference.
Those represented as octagons do arithmetic that may itself require a small
circuit (see Supplementary Material). Neuron II, which codes BRep as a firing
rate, is the output neuron of the circuit. It is given a leakage conductance that
elevates its baseline potential and firing rate above zero so that that these can
both increase, to convey confidence in the validity of the currently active
representation, and decrease, to convey confidence that it is invalid. The
remainder of the circuit was constructed to approximate the exactly calculated
value of BRep as a function of Zcom, Zlo, and Zhi shown in (C). When Zcom,
Zrec, and Zhi of the exact curves are equal, BRep increases from zero as an
accelerating function of the value of Zcom, forming a curve that is the upper
envelope of the set of full BRep curves. This upper envelope is emulated by the
output of neuron IV, which transforms Zcom into a power function of Zcom
with the exponent being chosen so that the firing rate of II will approximate the
upper envelope of the exactly calculated curves. By definition, Zcom cannot be
greater than Zlo. For a given value of Zlo, BRep is on the above-described
envelope when Zcom = Zlo = Zhi . It decreases as Zcom decreases, at a rate
that is greater, the greater Zhi , as seen in (C). This behavior is emulated if
neuron II is subject to divisive inhibition that is
(Continued)
FIGURE 3 | Continued
proportional to a power function of Zhi (Zlo − Zcom). Neuron III provides this
inhibitory input; it receives excitatory input from both Zhi and neuron V, whose
output is proportional to Zlo − Zcom. The output of neuron III is proportional to
a power function of the product of its inputs. If an active hippocampal
representation is valid, then Zlo + Zrec − Zcom must be less than or equal to
NA. If this condition is violated, the current context cannot be that currently
represented by the hippocampus, and BRep will be infinitely negative, as seen
in the exact calculations of (A,C); in the circuit of (B) neuron I fires when
Zlo + Zhi = Zcom > NA and massively inhibits neuron II. (C) Exact values of
BRep calculated from combinatorial formulas. Color coding as in (A). (D) Firing
rate of neuron II. Note that it emulates (C) quite well.
FIGURE 4 | Expected BRep values as a function of Zcur for various
values of Zrec. (A) Expected BRep as a function of Zcur when BACON is
tested in a context that is more or less well-known (differing Zrec values). (B) If
BACON is placed in a novel context that is somewhat similar to one for which
there is a representation, the representation of the known context will become
active. Expected BRep for this representation as a function of Zcur is shown for
several degrees of similarity between the two contexts and several levels of
Zrec for the encoded context. When the current context and the familiar one
are not very similar, BRep goes negative from the very start of the session and
does so more rapidly, the better known (i.e., the greater the Zrec of) the familiar
context. When the two contexts are similar, BRep also eventually goes negative
and does so sooner the more is known about the familiar context. However,
especially at intermediate values of Zrec, BRep for the previously familiar
context first becomes quite large.
is in fact the one that was created for the current context (i.e.,
is “valid”). As explained in the next section, this is the level at
which conditioning begins to become possible. If BRep exceeds
this value, we speak of the current context as probably being
“known” or “familiar.” Badd is taken as the level of BRep at which
the automaton is virtually certain that the current representation
is valid, and at which attributes are therefore allowed to be added
to active representations (i.e., updating mode is entered). We
note that it is crucial that a representation not be updated unless it
is almost certain that it is valid, because adding invalid attributes
to an existing representation would render it valid nowhere,
and any conditioning that had occurred to it would be lost to
effective usage. Therefore, Badd is made much higher than Bold
(Table 2). Bnew is the negative value of BRep below which it is
deemed highly unlikely that the current representation is valid
(i.e., BACON is probably in an unknown context for which it has
no representation).
When BRep falls below Bnew, creation mode (Figure 2A)
may be entered and a new representation established, but two
additional conditions must be satisfied:
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(1) New representations should be created only when enough
of the current context’s attributes have been sampled so
that, once learned, they will suffice to allow recognition of
the context on future occasions; we call this number Z0.
The minimum useful value for Z0 would be that for which
BRep reached Bold once all NA attributes of the context were
sampled. With the parameters used here this would be Z0=
10. However, if Z0 were so low, recognition of the context
on future occasions would require that every attribute of
a context have been sampled before reasonably confident
recognition could occur, which would presumably take a
maladaptively long time to be completed. In fact, we will
argue below that for our parameters, Z0 should be at least
45, which is the value that we adopt for the simulations of
this paper.
(2) If placed in one of two quite similar familiar contexts,
vicissitudes of attribute sampling early in the session are
likely to cause the representation of the incorrect context to
be activated intermittently until enough information about
the actual context has been acquired so that the correct
representation becomes continuously active. Such invalid
representations can sometimes cause BRep values sufficiently
negative to trigger creation of a new representation, which
would then be a second (and unwanted) representation for
the same context. To reduce the likelihood of this happening,
representation creation is suppressed if during the session,
some representation has generated a BRep sufficiently positive
that it is likely to be the actual representation of the
context; the degree of positivity required is Bpv (“pv” for
“probably valid”), and for the simulations of this paper this
was set equal to Bold. This rule helps prevent unwanted
representation creation; however, if the automaton is placed
in a new context that is quite similar to a familiar one, the
representation of the familiar context is likely to be activated
and may generate a quite high BRep value (see Figure 4B
and associated discussion). When this happens, the above
rule, if unmodified, would prevent a representation of this
new context from being created. However, if the context is
novel, currently observed attributes and recalled attributes
associated with existing representations will eventually
disagree sufficiently to generate BRep values below Bnew, and
once this has occurred for all representations that formerly
dictated suppression of creation, the suppression is lifted and
creation of the new representation is allowed.
Given the above rules, creation of a new representation will
usually occur when an active representation generates a BRep
value below Bnew. However, if there is no existing representation
for some context at least somewhat similar to the current one,
the number of CA3′ cells initially activated (denoted XPo) may
remain below K0, EC’out remain silent, and BRep remain zero,
even after sampling considerable numbers of attributes. In such
cases a new representation is created if the number of cells active
in the pre-recurrent input activity pattern of CA3′ (XPo) is still
less than K0 by the time Zcur reaches Z0.
Finally, if a new representation has just been created, it is
by definition valid for the remainder of the session; therefore
updating occurs at every subsequent sample of the session.
Control of Context Fear Conditioning and Expression
Conditionability
Context fear conditioning in BACON is due to LTP of CA3′-
Amygdala’ synapses, which occurs at synapses between active
CA3′ neurons and amygdala’ cells when the amygdala’ cells are
depolarized by a US (Maren and Fanselow, 1995; Johansen et al.,
2014). Obviously this cannot occur until a representation of the
context has been created, but one would also not want it to occur
unless there was reasonable evidence that the representation is
valid.
We thus make conditionability increase linearly as a function
of the degree to which BRep exceeds its value at Bold, reaching a
maximum of unity when BRep= Badd (Figure 5—recall that Badd
corresponds to virtual certainty):
Cnd = linsig (BRep|Bold,Badd), (4)
(see Methods for definition of linsig). We then calculate the
increment in strength due to a US as:
1Strength = α  Cnd (5)
where α is the amygdala learning rate parameter (Table 2). The
black curves in Figure 6A show the growth of conditionability as
sampling of contextual attributes progress throughout a session
in a context for which a representation was previously created.
The curves start rising from Cnd = 0 when expected BRep =
Bold. BRep increases both earlier and faster with increasing Zrec
because the more that is known about the context, the faster BRep
increases as information about the current context is acquired.
This much is straight-forward and we believe plausible.
However, special issues arise when USs occur during sessions
where representations were created.
One of these concerns the value of Z0 (the minimum Zcur at
which a representation can be created). We argued above that
given BACON’s parameters, Z0 should be at least 10. However,
if Z0 were in fact 10 and we introduced BACON into a new
and distinctive context, a representation for the context would
then be created at sample 10. Since, as pointed out above, a
representation is by definition absolutely valid for the remainder
FIGURE 5 | Fear conditioning and expression modes. Susceptibility to
LTP (conditionability) and transmission at levels determined by established LTP
are neuro-modulator controlled as shown. Explained in text.
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FIGURE 6 | Expected Cnd and Fear (VAmyg) as a function of Zcur and
Zrec with corresponding animal data. (A) Conditionability, as explained in
Results. The black curves are for sessions entered with the specified Zrec
values. For all curves Expected Cnd = linsig [BRep(Expected Zcom |Zcur ,
Zrec)|Bold , Badd ]. The bold dashed red curve is for a session in which
representation creation occurs at Z0; it is calculated in the same way as the
other curves but taking into account that Zrec increases with each successive
sample subsequent to representation creation; thus Zrec = Zcur (as indicated
for the two circled values). The thin dashed red line corresponds to the
empirically untenable possibility, discussed in the text, that Cnd rises to its
maximum value as soon as a representation is created. (B) Fear as a function
of Zcur for automata previously conditioned in a new context with a US after 60
or 80-samples and the session then terminated. Vertical dashed lines indicate
that Cnd and Fear expression plateau at the same number of attributes
sampled. (C–E) Empirical demonstrations of effects produced by BACON (C)
Immediate shock deficit (Data from Fanselow, 1990, Figure 2). (D) Shortening
of deficit due to pre-exposure (Redrawn data from Fanselow, 1990, Figure 3;
dashed lines indicate an interpretation consistent with simulation data). (E)
Gradual onset of freezing at start of session (Data from Wiltgen et al., 2006).
Decline is due to extinction, which automaton does not emulate.
of a session in which it is created, conditionability should at least
start to rise from zero at that point. However, suppose we were to
remove BACON from the context right after the representation
was created and then later re-introduce it. Since Zrec would now
be only 10, all NA (=100) attributes would have to be sampled
before BRep rose to Bold and conditioning became possible. That
would leave us with the peculiarity that conditioning becomes
possible after 10 samples in a fully novel context but only after 100
in one with which the automaton is already familiar. In order to
prevent such an anomaly, Z0 would have to be such that Expected
BRep on a session following an initial one that terminated just after
Z0 samples, would reach Badd once this same number of samples
were made in the latter session (i.e., Expected BRep = Badd when
Zcur = Zrec = Z0). Reference to Figure 6A shows this to occur
when Z0 = 45, which value we have used for the simulations of
this paper.
The other issue concerns the rate at whichCnd should increase
if the automaton is left in the context after creation of the
representation. Basing Cnd on BRep calculated from Zcur , Zrec,
and Zcom seems to make sense when BACON is in-essence
making a statistical inference as to its whereabouts. However, if
a representation for the current context has just been created,
BACON can in-effect be certain that its active new representation
is valid. Thus, it might plausibly be argued that once the
representation is created, conditionability should jump to unity
for the remainder of that session, as indicated by the dashed
step function in Figure 6A. Alternatively, one might argue,
somewhat as in the previous paragraph, that for a given amount
of information available about the current context, Cnd should
not go down in a later session with the same information. In that
case, the upper limit for Cnd on the session of a representation’s
creation would be the value it would be expected to have given
random sampling of attributes on a later session. The bold red
dotted curve of Figure 6A plots this upper limit.
Whatever the cogency of either argument, it appears from
available data that in a novel context conditionability rises
gradually from zero following the period during which no
conditioning is possible (Fanselow, 1990), exactly as shown in the
bold dashed curve of Figure 6A. We therefore have constructed
BACON so that it computes Cnd in this way on the session of
encoding.
Fear expression
Just as it would make little sense for fear to become conditionable
before an animal has enough information about a context to
know where it is, so too expression of previously conditioned
fear should depend on an animal’s confidence about its locale.We
thus let the effective conductance (Ge’) produced by a potentiated
excitatory CA3′-amygdala’ synapse be dependent on BRep, being
zero when BRep = 0 and becoming equal to its full potentiated
value Ge when BRep = Badd (Figure 5) Specifically,
G′e = linsig(BRep|0,Badd)  Ge. (6)
Ge’ is here taken to begin its increase at BRep= 0, rather than at
Bold (compare to equation 4) because we suppose that it is better
to err on the side of being afraid. The actual expression of fear is
proportional to the depolarization VAmyg that is produced by the
conductance Ge’:
VAmyg = G
′
e/(1+ G
′
e) (7)
(see Methods). Thus, the onset of fear expression increases as
BRep rises during a session (Figure 6B).
During a session where representation creation occurred, BRep
in Equation (6) is replaced by Expected BRep. This is used in
computing post-shock freezing.
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Neural Implementation of Control Rules and Bayesian
Calculations
Although the above logical description of the BACON algorithm
fully characterizes its operation (and provides a sufficient basis
for reading later sections), it is important to make clear that
the operations specified above could in fact be carried out by
neurons. There would be many ways of doing this; we sketch one
here.
Central to this model is the control of plasticity and other
neural properties. Since such control applies to entire classes
of neurons and synapses, we think of it as being exercised via
widely distributing neuromodulators. We assume that Recall
mode is the default and imagine separate modulators for
casting the network into Create and Update modes. We also
employ a third modulator to signal the extent of positivity of
BRep (posB)for controlling Cnd and fear expression. Control
of plasticity is assumed to be via direct effects on synaptic
properties, though one could imagine the possibility of indirect
control via modulation of firing rates. We note that the
work of Hasselmo (2006) provides a precedent for supposing
hippocampus to be thrown into different, neuromodulator-
controlled modes of operation during encoding and recall and
that a variety of neuromodulators are known to affect LTP
(e.g., Frey et al., 1989; Markram and Segal, 1990; Huerta
and Lisman, 1995; Thomas et al., 1996. Reviews: Kenney and
Gould, 2008; Lovinger, 2010; Lisman et al., 2011; Hawkins,
2013).
Figures 3B1,B2 sketch circuitry that can compute
approximate Bayesian weights of evidence; as seen in Figure 3C,
it does this fairly accurately. Figure 7 sketches circuitry that could
implement the control rules described in previous sections. We
think of prefrontal cortex as a plausible locus for this speculative
control circuitry.
Properties and Performance of BACON
Conditionability and fear expression will vary over time,
dependent on what attributes are randomly sampled. In order
to avoid proposing a theory of sampling over time, which is a
complex topic of its own, we use sample number (Zcur), rather
than time, as an independent variable. However, a few comments
about time per se are needed: The earliest that a representation
can be created and conditioning occur is at sample Z0, and
the earliest time that conditioning begins in rats is about 30 s
(Fanselow, 1990). We therefore imagine that at the start of a
session about Z0 (=45) attributes are sampled per 30 s. However,
we presume that any plausible theory of sampling would have
sampling slow greatly from this rate as the proportion of total
attributes sampled approached the total available. Indeed, we
imagine that it would be rare for full knowledge of a context’s
attributes to ever be achieved.
It should be noted that BACON has intentionally not been
designed to extinguish. Since extinction of context fear is time-
dependent, extinction could not have been included without
a model of sampling, which we wished to avoid. Moreover,
the behavioral consequences of the model’s Bayesian inference
mechanisms are seen farmore clearly in the absence of extinction.
FIGURE 7 | Sketch of circuit that would implement BACON control
rules. The upper dashed box represents a circuit that, like that in Figure 3B,
can compute BRep in response to input from neurons whose rate of firing
signals Zcur , Zrec, and Zcom. It has as output, neurons that separately convey
positive and negative values of BRep. These, along with activity of a neuron
whose activity level XPo is proportional to the number of neurons active in the
pre-recurrent input activity pattern of CA3′ (CA3Ptrno), determine the activity of
the neuromodulator-releasing neurons shown at the bottom of the figure. The
neuromodulator that configures the cortical-hippocampal circuit for
representation creation is released when the logical conditions in the lower
dashed box are met and the creation neuron is not inhibited by neuron F. We
have written the logical conditions themselves rather than a neural circuit that
would implement them because this makes the logic clearer, and there are
many straight-forward ways to implement these rules neurally. Inhibitory input
to the Create neuron from neuron F suppresses its activity if a representation
(different from the current one) for which BRep > Bpv was active earlier in the
session (as explained in the section on creation and updating). Circuitry for
controlling F is provided in the Supplementary Material (Topic D). The
neuromodulator that configures the cortical-hippocampal circuit for updating is
released when posB>Badd . However, if a new representation has been
created, the neuromodulator must continue to be released until the automaton
leaves the context. This is mediated by a binary (“0/1”) working memory
neuron that becomes active when representation creation occurs and remains
so until BACON leaves the context. The binary neuron also reconfigures input
to a neuron innervated by Zcom so that (as discussed in the text section on
Conditionability) it will reflect Expected Zcom instead of Zcom itself. This is
done by inhibiting transmitter release from the Zcom neuron and activating an
input from Zcur that causes the target cell to respond as the square of Zcur ;
this in-effect computes the expected value of Zcom given that Zrec equals Zcur
when the automaton is updating representations. Control of fear conditioning
and expression is mediated by a neuromodulator that is released in proportion
to the posB signal. Its effect on conditioning and fear expression are as
described in the text.
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FIGURE 8 | CA3Ptrno and CA3PtrnFnl activity during recall of context A
when BACON is familiar with both it and another context B. Zrec for A is
95 and for B is 80. (I) Contexts A and B are maximally distinct (50% of
attributes in common—only those common to all contexts). (II) Contexts A
and B are very similar (95% of attributes in common). In both cases a mix of
Representation A and B cells is active in the initial CA3′ pattern prior to
recurrent input (CA3Ptrno), whereas whichever representation has the larger
number of representatives active initially has all K = 60 of its members active
after two cycles of recurrent input (CA3PtrnFnl). Note that since there is some
overlap between the representations, the final pattern necessarily has some
representation A cells active when representation B is being expressed, and
conversely. When the contexts are very different (I), the final pattern is
consistently the complete representation of A after sampling only a few
attributes, and by the time about half of the full set of attributes have been
sampled, the initial pattern is also the complete correct representation.
However, when the contexts are very similar (II), the initial pattern is never
either representation in pure form, and only after about two thirds of the total
set of attributes has been sampled is the final pattern consistently the
complete valid set of representation cells. Note that in (II) there were a number
of occasions when the recurrent collateral system caused exactly equal
excitation of both representations. Such cases are indicated by half red/half
blue CA3PtrnFnl points; there are therefore more than K neurons active in the
final CA3′ pattern, and under that circumstance, EC’out activity is suppressed.
(III) The difference between the number of A and B representation cells in
CA3Ptrno as a function of strength of direct path synapses (dpf = factor
multiplying strength of direct path synapses on CA3′ cells), with patterns A
and B 93% similar. This is an average of 24 sets of simulations. For each set
the same random connectivity and the same attribute sampling orders were
used for a simulation at each dpf value. Paired t-test for All Indirect vs. All
Direct, All Indirect vs. dpf = 0.15, and dpf = 0.3 vs. 1.0 were all significant at
p < 0.01 or better.
The approach proposed for adding extinction is sketched in the
Discussion.
Illustrative Simulations
Figure 8 illustrates the operation of BACON’s hippocampus
in recall mode. For this simulation the automaton was first
given sufficient exposure to two contexts (A and B) to cause
creation of representations for each. Figures 8I,II show activity
during recall tests in context A. In Figure 8I context A and
B were fairly distinct, whereas in Figure 8II they were very
similar. It should be borne in mind that the automaton’s
knowledge of those contexts for which it has representations
will usually, as here, be incomplete unless it has spent a
great deal of time in those contexts. Moreover, because of the
vicissitudes of random attribute sampling, attributes common
to two different contexts will often have become associated
with one representation but not the other. Thus, if tested in
either context, where it will again sample attributes at random,
it may well sample common attributes that by chance became
associated with the other context, and early in a session these
might by chance predominate. As a result, EC’in activity will
often activate some elements of incorrect representations in
CA3′. The graphs show the number of active CA3′ units
that were part of the representations of each context as
sampling progressed during the test. This is shown both prior
to input from the recurrent collateral system (CA3Ptrno) and
after the final iteration of such input (CA3PtrnFnl). In both
simulations there was a mix of elements of each representation
active prior to recurrent collateral input, but in the post-
recurrent input representations, whichever pattern had the most
active elements prior to recurrent input prevailed. Moreover,
as sampling progressed, the valid representation increasingly
predominated. When A and B were quite different, the final
output of CA3′ was the valid representation starting fairly early
in the session; when they were quite similar, it took many
samples before the final representation was consistently the
valid one.
This sort of simulation provides a good opportunity to
evaluate the consequences of using the direct vs. indirect
pathways during recall. As will be explained in Discussion, it was
expected that use of the indirect path alone during recall should
lead to more reliable activation of the actual current context’s
representation than use of only the direct one. However, both
operating together should produce somewhat better performance
than either operating alone. The ratio of strength of direct
path to indirect path synapses in recall mode is the parameter
dpf. In simulations I and II only the indirect pathway was
operational (dpf = 0). Figure 8III shows the preponderance
of Representation A over B neurons in CA3′ prior to recurrent
collateral input, as a function of dpf in simulations like those
in I and II. As expected, the indirect pathway produces better
separation than the indirect one, but both together are best.
However, the advantage of incorporating input from the direct
pathway is modest and is seen only if input from the direct
pathway is relatively weak. For simplicity’s sake we chose to use
only the indirect pathway (i.e., dpf = 0) in the simulations below.
Having considered the activity of the hippocampus alone,
Figure 9 brings in the rest of the circuit. It shows two simulations.
In both, BACON was fear-conditioned in a context A after pre-
exposure to a very different context D. It was then tested either in
A (Figure 9I) or in a different but somewhat similar new context
B (Figure 9II). The colored bars at the top of Figures 9I,II show
what contexts the automaton was in and when shock was given.
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FIGURE 9 | Illustrative simulations. BACON was pre-exposed to context D
(blue—70 samples) and then given a US at the end of 70 samples in a novel
context A. Context A was maximally different from D (the only attributes
common to them were the 50 attributes that were part of all contexts). A
subsequent test session (which is what is shown in detail) was either (I) in
context A or (II) in a partially similar context B (green—75 attributes common
to A). The bars at the top of the figure indicate what context the automaton
was in throughout the simulation. (a) Fear. (b) BRep. The active representation
that was controlling EC’out activity and determining BRep is indicated by
marker color. (c) Overlap of active CA3Ptrno and CA3PtrnFnl cells with each
existing representation. (d) Zcur , Zrec, Zcom, and XPo (i.e., number of cells
active in CA3Ptrno ) as a function of sample number. Details of black numbered
points: (I). (1) For the first several samples the number of cells active in CA3′
prior to recurrent input (XPo) was less than the K0 neurons needed to produce
further CA3′ activity, so in (c) there is no CA3PtrnFnl. (2) After a few samples,
this ceased to be the case, but attributes that were common to all contexts
were sampled in such a way that CA3PtrnFnl included both A and D
representations; therefore it included more than K active neurons, and EC’out
activity was suppressed (no Zrec and Zcom in d and BRep = 0 in b). Although
some of the CA3′ neurons now active made potentiated synapses with amyg’
neurons, no fear is expressed because BRep = 0. (3) By this time, enough
attributes unique to context A had been sampled so that CA3PtrnFnl was the
complete context A representation. CA3′ therefore drove the EC’out cells with
which the CA3′ cells had potentiated synapses, Zrec became 70, and Zcur
and Zcom were sufficient to generate a slightly positive BRep. This allowed
some transmission at active, potentiated CA3′-amyg’ synapses, which caused
contextual fear expression to begin. As Zcur and Zrec further increased, BRep
grew and produced more fear. (4) BRep reaches Bold . Conditioning therefore
became possible (i.e., Cnd (not shown) went positive). (5) At sample 62 BRep
reached Badd . From then on there was full expression of the fear that had
previously been conditioned. Moreover, sampled attributes that had not
previously become associated with the context could now become so. As a
result there was a sudden increase in Zrec and thereafter a further increase
(Continued)
FIGURE 9 | Continued
whenever another not already known attribute was sampled. As Zcur , Zrec,
and Zcom increased, so too did BRep. (II). (1) Initially XPo was < K0, so there
was no CA3Ptrno activity. (2) Both RepresentationA and B cells were active in
CA3PtrnFnl; thus Zrec, Zcom, and BRep are zero. (3) As more attributes were
sampled, the representation of cntxt A, the conditioning context, which was
more similar to the current context than to cntxt D became expressed in
CA3PtrnFnl. During some of this time, there was a small positive weight of
evidence (BRep) for the validity of this representation and a little fear was
expressed. (4) As the sampling continued, attributes that were not among
those associated with the currently active conditioning context were sampled
and provided evidence that the current context was not B; this caused a
negative BRep value to emerge. When BRep was negative, no fear was
expressed even though the hippocampal representation of the conditioning
context was active. (5) At sample 57 BRepfell below Bnew, and since Zcur was
greater than Z0 (=45), a representation of the current context (context B) was
created. Because the representations of A and B had a few cells in common,
there is some fear expressed, which grew as the BRep value for context B’s
representation increased. (6) BRep reached Badd . Increases in BRep beyond
Badd do not cause any increased expression of whatever fear has been
conditioned (Equation 6), so fear levels off. Fear leveled off when BRep reached
Badd, because could not increase further once because BRep reached Badd .
Note first that in Figure 9Ic, as in Figure 8I, when BACON was
tested in a familiar context after having been exposed to it and
another fairly dissimilar one, CA3′ activity separates well even
prior to recurrent collateral input, and CA3PtrnFnl becomes the
complete representation of context A early in the session. On the
other hand, when placed in a different unfamiliar context B that
was moderately similar to A, the hippocampus initially activated
the representation of A, but eventually (after having acquired
enough information about the current context to show that A is
invalid) created a new representation for B.
Figure 9Ib plots BRep for the active representation throughout
the simulation, with which representation was active indicated
by point color. When in context A, the representation of A
became the sole representation active at sample 15 (black
circle point 3). This allowed EC’out neurons to be activated
(Zrec∼70, Figure 9Id). Since most of the currently sampled
attributes overlapped those then active in EC’out (Zcom slightly
less than Zcur in Figure 9Id), BRep took on a positive value, and
since the context A CA3′ representation cells now active were
those to which fear was conditioned, fear expression began to
rise (Figure 9Ia). As more attributes of A were sampled, Zcur
and Zcom rose (Figure 9Id), and so BRep and fear increased
correspondingly (Figure 9Ia). At black circle point 5, BRep
reached Badd. This allows maximal expression of conditioned
fear and allows updating of the representation of A so all
sampled attributes that were not already associated with the
representation of A became so causing sudden increments in
Zrec and Zcom (Figure 9Id).
When placed in context B (unfamiliar, but moderately
similar to A), the representation of A was activated early
on (Figure 9IIc). The attributes of A and B were sufficiently
similar so that a positive BRep value developed at about sample
8 (Figure 9IIb), with a corresponding modest expression of
conditioned fear (Figure 9IIa), but by sample 60 (black circled
point 5) differences between current attributes and the recalled
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attributes of representation A became so great (Figure 9IId) that
BRep fell below Bnew (point 5 in Figure 9IIb), and a representation
for context B was created. Once that happened fear expression
occurred only because the representation of context B had some
neurons in common with that of context A.
Representation Characteristics
Representations in BACON, even of quite similar contexts,
have only limited overlap (i.e., the encoding (creation) process
produces considerable “pattern separation”). Two factors
contribute to the slightness of overlap. First, as often discussed,
the large number of DG’ neurons, their innervation by random
groups of ECin cells, and the firing of only the K most excited,
promote pattern separation; these factors cause contexts with
90% overlap at the level of ECin to have about 30% overlap at DG’
during representation creation. Second, contexts are generally
created when only a fraction of their total attributes have been
(randomly) sampled. With this factor operating along with the
first, overlap of the representations for 90% similar contexts falls
to about 10%. As a result, even when two contexts are extremely
similar, relatively distinct sets of attributes will control the
form of their representations and very different representations
result.
Conditionability—The Immediate Shock Deficit and
Pre-familiarization
When placed in a novel context that is fairly distinct from any
familiar one, a representation of the context will be created
at sample Z0. Conditionability begins to increase at this point
and continues to do so as Zcur increases, until it reaches its
maximum value of unity (Figure 6B, bold red dashed curve).
This delay, with subsequent gradual increase in conditionability,
corresponds to the immediate shock deficit of real context fear
conditioning (Figure 6C).
If placed in a familiar context (i.e., one for which
a representation was previously established) conditionability
begins to rise when BRep reaches Bold. The more that is
known about the context’s attributes (i.e., the greater Zrec)
at the start of the session, the sooner Bold will be reached
(Figures 4A, 6A). Figure 6D illustrates such an earlier rise in
conditionability following pre-familiarization with the to-be-
conditioned context in a real experiment on the immediate sock
deficit. In the theoretical case the rate of rise is generally greatest
in the session of creation, because expected conditionability is
proportional to Expected BRep which is an increasing function
of both Zcur and Zrec, and whereas Zrec increases at each
successive sample during the session of encoding, on later
sessions it is constant throughout a session unless BRep comes to
exceed Badd.
It is a basic feature of BACON that the attributes of a
novel context cannot begin to be learned until a hippocampal
representation is formed, and this cannot occur until the number
of samples made exceeds Z0. Therefore, even many repeated
exposures to the context, each of which is too short for Z0 samples
to be made, will not reduce the immediate sock deficit. Moreover,
attributes cannot be added to an existing representation unless
BRep exceeds Badd. Therefore, once BACON has been familiarized
sufficiently with a novel context to allow some measure of
conditioning, further later exposures will only be effective in
shortening the immediate shock deficit if some of the exposures
are long enough to allow BRep to exceed Badd. To our knowledge
no experiments that would evaluate either of these features have
been published.
Fear Expression—Delayed Onset of Fear and Effects
of Context Familiarity
Fear expression in BACON develops gradually when the
automaton is introduced into to a feared context (Figure 6B). As
illustrated in Figure 6E, fear-induced freezing behavior does in
fact develop gradually, though because extinction sets in, the rise
is followed by a decline that is not emulated by BACON because
we chose not to incorporate extinction mechanisms.
Since both conditionability and fear expression become
maximal when BRep reaches Badd, both become maximal at about
the same time (Figures 6A,B—note dashed lines between frames
Figures 6A,B).
Generalization
In BACON, fear conditioned in one context may generalize
to another similar context for either of two reasons: (1) The
hippocampal representations of the two contexts may have
neurons in common. (2) The vicissitudes of attribute sampling
may sometimes cause periods of activation of the hippocampal
representation of a familiar context similar to the actual context
rather than of the actual context itself. The latter is almost certain
to occur if the context does not yet have a representation of its
own. We chose the automaton’s parameters so that for contexts
with 90% attribute overlap, hippocampal representations would
only overlap by about 10%. Therefore, generalization in BACON
FIGURE 10 | Generalization of context fear. BACON was conditioned by a
shock at the end of a session in novel context B and then tested either in the
conditioning context (black and gray curves) or in a generalization context A
(colored curves). Context A’s similarity to B was either 85% (green), 90% (blue),
or 95% (red). The automaton was pre-exposed to either the generalization
context (A) (II) or to a very different context (D) as a control for per-exposure
per se (I). Because degree of conditioning is somewhat affected by
pre-exposure to a context similar to the conditioning context, separate
conditioning-context tests had to be run for each pre-exposed generalization
context (shades of gray in II). Each curve is the average of 30 simulations. The
pre-familiarization session was 95 samples, the conditioning session 80, and
the test session 99.
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is usually attributable more to misidentification of context than
to representation overlap.
Degree of context fear generalization is very dependent
on the extent to which the automaton is already familiar
with the context in which generalization is tested. Figure 10I
illustrates generalization when BACON is not familiar with any
contexts that are at all similar to that in which it has been
conditioned. During generalization tests in such cases there is
initially substantial generalization of fear because the automaton
at first misidentifies a similar but unfamiliar test context as the
conditioning context itself. But once it is recognized that the
test context is a new one, a representation for it is created,
and fear then falls off; the only fear that then remains is that
caused by those representation neurons that are common to
the test and conditioned context. However, if BACON was
pre-familiarized with the test context (Figure 10II), only a
slight initial surge of fear occurs, because the pre-established
representation of the test context itself quite rapidly becomes
active.
Pre-exposure to the conditioning, as opposed to the test
context also diminishes generalization (not illustrated). This
happens because the better-known the conditioning context (the
greater its Zrec), the more rapidly a similar context will be
recognized as different. Decreased generalization of stimuli that
are better known has been observed both for context fear and
other forms of conditioning (Kiernan and Westbrook, 1993;
Rudy and O’Reilly, 1999).
Effects on Conditioning of Familiarity with Similar
Contexts
Rudy and O’Reilly (1999; see also Rudy et al., 2002) have
published intriguing experiments in which, when rats were
shocked in an unfamiliar context similar to one they knew, fear
became conditioned to the familiar but absent context. BACON
does something similar. The reason can be seen in Figure 11I,
which shows what representations are active when BACON is
placed in an unfamiliar context B similar to a context A to
which it was pre-exposed. Initially the existing representation
of A is activated because B has many of the same attributes
as A. As sampling progresses, the automaton becomes more
and more “certain” that it really is in A, as reflected by the
gradual increase of A’s BRep value (and as discussed above with
respect to Figure 4B). But eventually sufficient discrepancies
between currently observed attributes and those associated with
A’s representation mount to a point where a representation for
B itself is created (and its BRep value then increases rapidly).
If a US were given at the point marked “Early” fear would be
conditioned to context A, if given at the “Middle” point, each
representation would be active in about half the runs, and if given
“Late,” conditioning would be to context B.
Had BACON been pre-familiarized with a context, D, very
different from B, conditioning at the corresponding points in
the experiment would always have been to the actual context, B
(Figure 11II).
Fear expressed in each context after giving BACON USs at
one of these three points are shown in Figures 11III–V, VII–IX.
When BACON had not been pre-exposed to A, it always showed
FIGURE 11 | Conditioning in a novel context when a similar context
is familiar. Context A and B are 95% similar; context D is maximally
different from both (50% similar). (I,II). Sessions in context B after
pre-exposure to either context A or D. Arrows (Early, Middle, Late) indicate
when USs were given during each type of conditioning session. Circles plot
percentage of runs in which the specified representation was active, and
lines the mean weight of evidence for the representation (same color
coding). (III–X) Average fear levels in contexts A (green bars) and B (red
bars) after conditioning in B following pre-exposure to either context A or
D. First 3 graphs in each row are simulation results for test following
conditioning with USs at the early, middle, or late time points.
Pre-exposures were always 60 samples; conditioning sessions were 75
(Early), 88 (Middle) or 95 (Late) sample long with US at end. All figures are
averages for 30 simulations. (VI,X). Far-right graphs are Rudy and O’Reilly
data (Rudy and O’Reilly, 1999).
considerable fear of B but little of A, though some generalization
did occur. However, when it had been pre-exposed to A, the
outcome depended on when the US was given (Figures 11III–V).
When given Early, fear of A was greater than B (Figure 11III)
(and also greater than fear of A in the absence of pre-exposure
to it). When given Late, fear during testing was greater for B
(the actual conditioning context) than for A (Figure 11V). When
the US had been at the Middle time point, fear was expressed
mostly to A in some runs and to B in others (not shown),
with the average across simulations being about equal for both
(Figure 11IV). In the actual experiments (Figures 11VI,X) the
pattern of results is similar to those of the Middle time point
simulations. In the experiments of panels Figures 11VI,X two
shocks were given, one at 120 and another at 240 s. In that
case one could imagine the first being at our “Early” and the
second at our “Late” time point. However, in other experiments,
which had similar results, a single shock was given, as in our
simulations.
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Discussion
Multiple Modes of Hippocampal
Function—Necessity and Benefits
The algorithm described here was an attempt to construct a
neurally plausible mechanism for context fear conditioning. The
role of the hippocampus in this is the creation and subsequent
recall of permanent, relatively non-overlapping representations
of contexts to which associations can be made. We assume
that at each entry to a context its attributes are discovered
serially in random order. Since attributes of a context will be
sampled in different orders on different occasions, and since
information about a context will usually be incomplete when
its representation is created, determining whether a context is
novel (in which case a representation for it should be created) or
familiar (in which case pattern completion mechanisms should
be allowed to operate) is a challenging problem. This led us to
construct for BACON extra-hippocampal machinery designed
to make optimal decisions as to the novelty or familiarity of
whatever context it was in, and then to allow this machinery
to configure the hippocampus specifically for representation
creation, updating, or recall, as required.
This strategy solves two problems that arise if the
hippocampus is assumed to have only one state:
(1) In conventional theories of the hippocampus the occurrence
of a novel stimulus configuration that is similar to one
previously encoded may activate the complete code of the
familiar stimulus with the result that a new representation
will not be created but its attributes will, improperly, become
associated with the existing representation. Or conversely, in
the presence of a known stimulus, incomplete sampling of
its attributes or sampling of attributes not originally encoded
will cause a new representation for it to be created so that
one stimulus will now have two different (pattern-separated)
representations. This is the so-called “pattern separation-
completion tradeoff” that has been extensively discussed
in the literature (O’Reilly and McClelland, 1994; and see
O’Reilly and Rudy, 2001). The sort of control of hippocampal
mode that we have utilized in BACON essentially abolishes
this problem, because decisions as to novelty vs. familiarity
are made optimally, and hippocampal plasticity is shut off
when it would be inappropriate.
(2) Although, as will be explained below, pattern recall should
work best if information about a stimulus reaches CA3′ via
the indirect (EC’in-DG’-CA3
′) pathway, it has been argued,
and is often accepted, that properties of the indirect pathway
that are needed for optimal representation encoding make it
impossible for the pathway to also be used effectively during
recall (Treves and Rolls, 1992; O’Reilly and McClelland,
1994; Treves et al., 2008). However, this sort of argument
loses all force if, as is done in BACON, the properties of the
hippocampus can be configured for its different modes of
operation.
DG-CA3 Projection
In BACON each DG’ neuron has a single dedicated CA3′
partner with which it makes a non-plastic synapse. In the
actual hippocampus there are less CA3 than dentate cells, and
each dentate cell innervates a small number of CA3 cells, via
synapses that show some sort of plasticity, but not the type of
associative NMDA-dependent plasticity seen at EC-dentate and
recurrent CA3 network synapses (Bortolotto et al., 2003; Reid
et al., 2004). In so far as a KWTA competition within DG’
is used to choose the cells for a representation, it seemed to
us to make good design sense to let those cells have specific
partners in CA3′. Thus, representational elements are in-effect
DG’-CA3′ dyads that, during recall, are excited by potentiated
inputs from EC’in and that are bound to other dyads of the
same contextual representation by the potentiated synapses of the
recurrent collateral network.
CA3′ cells could have been paired withDG’ cells bymaking the
synapse between a DG’ cell and one of a small number of CA3′
cells it innervates functional only if and when the DG’ neuron
won a KWTA competition during representation creation.
Something like this seems to happen during real nervous
system development where activity-dependent mechanisms
cause vertebrate muscle fibers, cerebellar Purkinje cell, and
thalamic neurons to become innervated by single motor neurons,
climbing fibers, or topographically close thalamic afferents (e.g.,
Favero et al., 2009; Kano and Hashimoto, 2009). However, for
us it was simplest to just take the existence of DG’-CA3′ pairs
as given. Nevertheless, it should be noted that a given DG’-
CA3′ pair will never get used if the sets of attributes whose EC’
representations innervate the DG’ cell never occur together in the
“life” of the automaton. Therefore, pairing up a CA3′ cell with an
active DG’ cell at the time of representation creation would have
allowed a smaller CA3′ layer and would have reduced the size
of the huge recurrent collateral network. One can imagine that
this could be happening in the biological hippocampus and could
account for the smaller number of CA3 than dentate neurons, the
limited fan-out of dentate neurons, and the presence of atypical
plasticity at dentate-CA3 synapses.
Direct/Indirect Pathway Balance in Recall
Since, as discussed above, we can ignore computational
arguments against a role for the indirect pathway during recall,
we consider the relative merits of using it vs. the direct one:
Each DG’ and CA3′ cell will be innervated by F = 60 of the
NCtx = 1000 EC’ attribute cells. The innervation of each DG’
and CA3′ cell is chosen randomly and independently; thus the
two members of a DG’-CA3′ pair do not receive input from the
same set of EC’ attribute cells. When the representation for a
context is created, there will usually be on the order of Z0 = 45
EC’in attribute cells active, and on average each DG’ and each
CA3′ cell will be innervated by (a different) 2–3 of them. The
synapses of the active attribute cells on the K DG’ and CA3′ cells
of the forming representation will become potentiated. In CA3′
it will be the approximately 2–3 active EC’in-CA3
′ synapses that
innervate each cell that become potentiated. However, in DG’ the
cells that are active will be selected as the K that are most excited
and therefore most heavily innervated by the active EC’ attribute
cells. The DG’ cells that are active will therefore have a richer
active EC’ attribute cell innervation than will the population as a
whole, and it will be some 7–8 synapses on them that will become
potentiated.
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During recall, DG’ and CA3′ cells receive information from
EC’in only via potentiated synapses. In order for a representation
cell for a context A to be selectively activated by context A, as
opposed to a different but similar context B, a representation
cell forAmust receive effective input from attribute-representing
neurons that are specific to A, and if A and B are very similar,
there will not be many A-specific attribute neurons. So when
very similar contexts must be differentiated, the DG’ cells, which
get effective input from 7 to 8 EC’in cells, are more likely to get
input from a given attribute (which will be passed to a cells CA3′
partner) than will the CA3′ cells, which get effective input from
only 2 to 3 EC’in cells. Thus, if only the direct or only the indirect
pathway were used for recall, the indirect would be better because
it would be more likely to provide effective input from a context
A-specific neuron. However, if both the direct and the indirect
pathway provide information that determines the response of
CA3′ cells prior to recurrent input, differentiation should be
somewhat better than with either pathway alone. As shown in
Figure 8III, the effective separation of the representations of two
similar contexts at CA3′ prior to recurrent input (i.e., CA3Ptrno)
as a function of the relative strength of the direct pathway is in
fact just as expected. Moreover, it seems to be optimal for the
direct pathway to be weak relative to the indirect one. This may
be seen as consistent with the biological situation, where both
pathways are present, but the direct one makes relatively distal
synapses on CA3 neurons.
From CA3′ to EC’out
As explained at the start of Results, we have allowed CA3′ to
innervate EC’out directly, rather than via a CA1-like processing
stage because complete innervation in the recurrent collateral
network and in EC’out made a CA1’ redundant. Since it is the
Shaffer collateral synapses of CA3 cells on CA1 neurons that
have told us much of what we know about Hebbian LTP, it
may seem ironic that we did not explicitly include a CA1 in the
algorithm. However, in the current model, the Hebbian nature
of EC synapses on dentate and CA3 cells are sufficient to produce
effective encoding and recall of contextual representations. In a
model of this type CA1 plasticity would serve mainly to help
mitigate any errors or omissions that remained in representations
after their processing by the recurrent collateral network.
Functioning of DG’ and CA3′ during
Representation Creation and Recall
There have been a number of experiments in which activity in
dentate or CA3 in novel or familiar contexts has been assessed
or manipulated. We consider here how BACON would behave in
some of these.
Activity in Novel Contexts
BACON will start its time in a novel context in Recall mode, but
fairly soon BRep will fall below Bnew and a new representation will
be created. For the remainder of the session, as each additional
attribute gets sampled, excitation will be passed to CA3′ over
the direct and indirect pathways, CA3PtrnFnl determined, and
since the system is in Update mode, CA3PtrnFnl will be reflected
back to DG’ so that the synapses between the added EC’in
attribute cells and DG’ cells can potentiate. From then on in
each computational cycle hippocampal activity will consist of
the K DG’-CA3′ pairs of cells of the current representation fully
active, with the rest of the cells of each layer silent. Moreover,
these active cells will overlap relatively little with those of other
representations. Consistent with this, it does appear that, whereas
there is a lot of overlap between the DG’ cells active in different
familiar contexts, during exposure to novel contexts DG’ activity
is quite context-specific, even when the contexts are similar
(Deng et al., 2013) (Table 3, A).
Activity in Familiar Contexts
In a familiar context BACON will operate in Recall mode until
such time as it “decides” it almost certainly “knows” where it
is (i.e., BRep > Badd) at which time Update mode will begin to
operate; we will assume for discussion that it is mainly Recall
mode that will be observed during most experiments. During
recall, it is DG’s job to pass to CA3′ information as to how
much excitation each DG’ cell has received from EC’in; therefore,
during recall the KWTA rule does not apply in DG’, and cells
there fire in proportion to their excitation. Thus, in DG’ any
cell that represents an encoded context having attributes in
common with the current one will fire to some degree. However,
in CA3′ the KWTA rule is operative. CA3Ptrno will typically
include cells (possibly many but usually a minority) that do
not represent the current context, because some representation
cells of other previously encoded contexts may happen to have
dense innervation from common attributes that happen to be
in the current attribute sample. However, CA3PtrnFnl, once it
emerges, will (if enough attributes have been sampled) be the
complete representation of the current context and will overlap
little with the representations of other, even similar, contexts. We
assume for the sake of discussion that it would be mostly this
final pattern of activity that would be detected in experiments.
In fact, recordings from real animals do seem to show that in
familiar contexts DG’ uses a rate code with cells active in different
contexts overlapping considerably, whereas in CA3′ there is little
overlap between those active in different but similar contexts.
Leutgeb et al. (2007), Neunuebel and Knierim (2014), Table 3, B;
see Supplementary Material, Topic F for further discussion and a
simulation of the Leutgeb experiment.
The proportion of sampled cells firing during tests in one of
two familiar contexts in rat dentate has been reported to be about
a third that in CA3 (Leutgeb et al., 2007). However, since rat
dentate has about 8 times more cells than CA3 (O’Reilly and
McClelland, 1994), this means that in absolute terms there are
perhaps some 2.5 times more cells active in rat DG than CA3
during recall. In BACON each DG’ cell innervates a single CA3′
cell, but whereas in Recall mode the number of cells active in
CA3′ is limited to K, there is no limit in DG’, and each cell
there fires in proportion to its degree of excitation by sampled
attributes that have potentiated synapses with it. In any given
context, a given attribute would excite any cell it innervated
that had previously become one of the representation cells of
some context. All K DG’ cells that had been active during the
formation of the current representation would be excited plus
presumably quite a number more. Thus, the observation that 2.5
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TABLE 3 | Some behavioral properties of BACON.
Prediction Evidence (for,
against, nil)?
A. In CA3′ only a small number (K) of cells will fire. During the first exposure to a novel context, there should be a fairly sudden shift in the population of
active cells as a representation for the context is created, and the population of active cells should thereafter be constant. For familiar contexts, the
same cells should always be active during different exposures to the same context, and substantially different cells active in different contexts. Even
quite similar familiar contexts should activate fairly different populations of cells
Fora,b
B. In DG’ patterns of activity will be very different for the remainder of sessions in which new representations are created (i.e., in novel contexts) than at
other times. Following representation creation activity patterns will have the same properties as those in CA3′ (few cells active; little overlap in cells
active in different contexts). At other times cells will be active at graded rates, and firing rate profiles across cells will differ more, the more different the
contexts
Fora,b,c
C. Upon introduction to a distinctive unfamiliar context, context fear conditioning will be impossible until after a delay (we refer to the delay for an
unfamiliar context as “D0,” which is about 30 s.), after which conditionability gradually increases (the immediate shock deficit)
Ford,e,f
D. Upon introduction to a familiar context, there will also be a delay before context conditioning can occur, but it will be a time D that is shorter than Do Fore,g
E. Repeated exposures of duration less than the D0to an unfamiliar context will not shorten D Nil
F. No amount of pre-familiarization will completely abolish the immediate shock deficit (i.e., reduce D to zero) Fore
Againstg,h
G. Upon introduction to a feared context, expression of fear will increase gradually Fori,j,k
H. Fear expression will rise gradually from very near the start of a testing session (in contrast to conditionability, which will begin to rise when BRep
reaches Bold ). However, conditionability and expression will reach their maxima at the same time (when BRep reaches Badd ) and thereafter be constant
Nil
I. Generalization of fear to familiar contexts will be less than to unfamiliar ones Nil
J. Generalization of fear from more familiar contexts will be less than from less familiar ones Forh,l
K. Conditioning to a novel context that is very similar to a familiar one may be to the familiar rather than the actual context Forl,o
L. The above effect will be less, the greater the delay of the US Nil
M. Generalization tests will often show initial fear that later falls off much too fast to be explained by known rates of extinction Nil
N. Loss of indirect path input to CA3′ during both encoding and recall does not seriously disrupt encoding or recall, but does reduce ability to
distinguish similar contexts. However, inactivation of DG’ during encoding alone has substantial effects on recall of contextual fear
Form,p
O. Inactivation of DG’ plasticity has no effect on selection of cells during encoding, but reduces ability to distinguish similar contexts during recall,
because without EC’-DG’ plasticity recall must occur entirely via direct path
Forn
aDeng et al. (2013). bLeutgeb et al. (2007). cNeunuebel and Knierim (2014). dFanselow (1986). eFanselow (1990). Also Fanselow, unpublished. fBlanchard et al. (1976). gMatus-Amat
et al. (2004). During pre-exposures and conditioning, rats were consistently carried to the test chamber in the same covered black bucket; the black bucket could therefore be considered
a part of the context, and “immediate” shocks should be seen as in-effect occurring at the transport- time after the beginning of contextual exposure. hKiernan and Westbrook (1993).
Whether, as in the previous experiment, a consistent environment immediately preceding nominal context entry may have made the “immediate” shock in-effect somewhat delayed
is not known. iWiltgen et al. (2006). jFanselow (1982). kLester and Fanselow (1986). lRudy and O’Reilly (1999). mNakashiba et al. (2012). nMcHugh et al. (2007). oRudy et al. (2002).
pKheirbek et al. (2013).
times more cells are active in DG relative to CA3 in a familiar
environment seems consistent with what BACON would predict
(see also Supplementary Material Topic F).
Inactivation of Dentate
Several studies have examined the effect of inactivating DG’.
In one study, dentate-CA3′ transmission was suppressed with
tetanus toxin during encoding, conditioning, and recall with
only very modest effects. Fear expressed during a test in
the conditioning context was roughly normal, as was degree
of generalization to a quite different context, but there
were some deficits in discrimination learning (Nakashiba
et al., 2012). Apparently consistent with this, a more recent
study found apparently normal fear during a test with DG’
inactivated following encoding and conditioning with DG
intact (Kheirbek et al., 2013). However, if DG was suppressed
during encoding and conditioning but not during recall, fear
of the conditioned context was diminished (Kheirbek et al.,
2013).
BACON would emulate these observations under similar
conditions: If DG’ were inoperative during both encoding and
recall, the indirect pathway would be used in both cases, and
recall would be fairly normal, though discrimination of similar
contexts would be somewhat reduced because one would lose
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the cooperative advantages of using both pathways, as discussed
above. However, if DG’ were suppressed only during encoding,
there would be a great deficit in conditioned fear. The CA3′
cells selected to comprise the representation would be those most
richly innervated by active EC’in neurons via the direct path, and
it would be only they that would become potentiated as part of
the representation creation process. However, during recall with
both pathways operative, input via the indirect path dominates.
But because synapses to DG’ did not become potentiated during
encoding, the input to CA3′ that determines CA3Ptrno will be via
DG’ input synapses that had become potentiated during previous
encodings when DG’ was intact and will not promote the firing
of representation neurons for the current context. If, on the other
hand, DG’ were suppressed only during recall, there would be
only a modest effect, as seen in Figure 8III and as discussed in
“Direct/Indirect pathway balance in recall,” above (Table 3, N).
There would also be only a modest deficit if DG’ plasticity were
permanently eliminated: During encoding DG’ would still select
DG’-CA3′ dyads, but since potentiation would be impossible
in DG’, it would be EC’in-CA3′ synapses that would become
potentiated and determine what CA3′ cells would be activated
during recall. Consistent with findings of McHugh et al. (2007),
there would be some deficits in discrimination ability but no
major dysfunction.
Direct Optogenetic Activation of Representation Cells
Liu et al. (2012) recently studied mice in which dentate cells
active during encoding of a context A were labeled with
channelrhodopsin so that they could be selectively activated
by stimulating dentate with light. The mice were then fear
conditioned in A but tested in a different context B, with and
without the dentate light stimulus on. As expected, the light
stimulus did evoke fear reactions. In BACON direct activation
of the DG’ cells that were active during encoding of A would
evoke a CA3PtrnFnl that was a complete representation of context
A even if only a portion of the relevant DG’ cells were successfully
activated. However, there would be a definite mismatch between
the attributes of context B observed during the test and the
recalled attributes of context A activated by the representation.
This mismatch would degrade BRep and decrease fear expression.
Thus, contextual fear would be expressed when the context A
representation was activated in context B, but consistent with the
behavioral findings, the fear would be of sub-normal magnitude.
Predictions, Tested, and Untested
BACON emulates many known aspects of real contextual fear
conditioning (Results and Table 3), suggesting the possibility
that biological context fear circuitry may work in a somewhat
BACON-like way. It should be appreciated that the algorithm’s
ability to do this was not explicitly built in; it is a natural
consequence of designing an algorithm that deals in an adaptive
way with the problems posed by context fear learning. The
algorithm also predicts a number of behavioral characteristics
that are presently unknown (Table 3) and that seem worth
experimental test. However, it should be emphasized that
predictions that depend on the algorithm’s Bayesian evaluations
of context identity could well be falsified without it ruling out the
more general idea that hippocampus operates in several distinctly
different modes and that control of these is determined in some
principled (but not necessarily Bayesian) way by comparisons
between attributes of the current context and those associated
with contexts from the animal’s past.
Unfinished Business
The present work grew out of an earlier attempt to construct a
fairly comprehensive model of fear conditioning that included
cue as well as context conditioning (Krasne et al., 2011). That
model accounted for much of the phenomenology of fear
conditioning; however, hippocampal representations of context
were assumed to develop gradually during contextual exposure,
without any theory as to mechanism. The current algorithm
supplies a mechanism, and ultimately the two models should be
merged.
A number of simplifying assumptions were made during the
design of BACON, and ways of moving beyond them should
be explored in future work. Some matters especially needing
consideration are these: (1) A theory of sampling. How does
attribute sampling vary over time; does it slow as the set
of attributes so-far observed during a session becomes more
complete? (2). We assumed that all contexts have the same
number of attributes. Ways of dealing with cases where this
is an implausible assumption are needed. Weight of Evidence
calculations depend on the total number of attributes available
for sampling in a situation (our NA). How might this number
be estimated on the fly without extensive prior sampling of a
context? (3) It seems not unlikely that sampling slows or stops
during freezing. If so, it would greatly affect BACON’s behavior
and needs to be considered as part of a theory of sampling. (4)
Random sampling is a useful simplifying assumption, but some
attributes are surely more salient than others. This ultimately
should be incorporated into a model such as this. (5) BACON
assumes that existing representations are activated serially and
evaluated for validity as they become active; a more sophisticated
algorithm that can compare validities of multiple attributes
in parallel would produce better performance. (6) Extinction,
which we chose to ignore, must be taken into account. It will
be introduced into the alogrithm at a later time by assuming,
as done in the above-mentioned model of the amygdala, that
extinction occurs because unreinforced fear responses cause
potentiation at synapses between active CA3′ neurons and
amygdala interneurons that inhibit BACON’s fear-producing
neurons.
Conclusion
We have constructed an algorithm, BACON, which randomly
and serially samples attributes of its current context, uses its
hippocampus to activate representations of whatever known
context best matches the current one, and computes the Bayesian
Weight of Evidence that the hippocampal representation is
or is not that of the actual context. If this value indicates
that the representation is valid, context fear conditioning and
expression are enabled. If not, the hippocampus is configured
to create a representation for the apparently novel context.
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This machinery works well, accounts for several well-known
aspects of context fear learning, such as the immediate shock
deficit, and makes new predictions. BACON’s use of external
control to enable hippocampal representation creation does
away with several problems that have plagued thinking about
hippocampal function (especially the conflict between pattern
separation and completion and problems that arise if the
“indirect” pathway from entorhinal cortrex to CA3 is used
both during representation creation and recall). Overall, we
believe that the approach taken provides insight into both
context fear learning mechanisms and hippocampal function in
general.
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